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RELIGION AND THE LAW
Tom C. CLARK*
This article will deal with the appropriate relationship that
must exist between religion and government under our
constitutional system. I have not employed the dichotomy
"church-state" relations because that terminology is "heavily
charged with emotional overtones"' from which I hope to
escape. The "Lord knows," as we used to say, that if any
problem needs an escape hatch from emotion it is this one.
Moreover, this dichotomy in reality has little relevance to
our situation for instead of one religion or sect we have a
hundred or so and in the place of one state we have fifty
with a federal government system superimposed over the
whole. Finally we operate under a written Constitution which
we are obliged to recognize and obey. Nor shall I employ
the clich6 "a wall of separation" that so many say the
Founders built between religion and government in our coun-
try. As I read our history no such wall has ever existed.
Besides, as Robert Frost points out: "Something there is
that doesn't love a wall." As I see it, ours is a unique situa-
tion; people of more than three score nationalities, having
many basic differences in religious beliefs, have come to
our shores and formed our national citizenship. Consequently,
when confronted by the challenges of this religious pluralism
our freedom in such matters can only be protected, as the
Constitution dictates - not by a wall between government
and religion - but through a wholesome separation of a
concordant nature. Otherwise, we will find ourselves in the
midst of religious wars that would be destructive of our being.
To me the problem is just that simple.
I.
I begin with a statement of Bishop James A. Pike in his
Rosenthal Lectures of 1962 (pp. 82-83), wherein he said:
The individual is more important than the State. He
can last longer, indeed for eternity. Therefore, his de-
velopment, his ability to be himself, to articulate, to
*A4oeiate Justice, United States Supreme Court.
f. DPrNAw, RELIGION, THE COURTS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1963).
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gather others around him and to seek to press his
ideas is of the utmost importance. This is all very
precious in our American tradition.
Further, in this is the most important factor: the
right of each individual to have an overview beyond
the State, a stance from which to criticize the State,
even when it would appear to be at its best. Therefore,
it is in our best tradition when we put up with sore
thumbs, rocks in the shoe, bulls in the china shop. We
put up with inconvenient people. We recognize the right
to be wrong - or what the majority may think is wrong.
There can be no doubt that the majority of our people
think that the Court was wrong in upholding the exercise
of the right of an atheist to do what she thought right but
the public believed wrong in the recent school prayer cases.
The Gallup Poll, released only recently, found the public
overwhelmingly opposed2 - almost three to one - to the
ruling that "religious exercises in public schools are illegal."
Indeed, Bishop Pike publicly opposed the Court's opinion,
apparently on policy grounds. On the same day of the
Gallup Poll release Evangelist Billy Graham declared that
"there might be a huge march on Washington that would
dwarf the civil rights march if the U.S. Supreme Court con-
tinues its trend toward throwing God and the Bible out of
our national life." This statement, too, was apparently based
on policy considerations rather than constitutional interpre-
tation since the Evangelist is not a lawyer. Mr. Graham also
declared that "Secularism is the fastest growing religion in
America" which is reminiscent of a contention made during
argument of Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
Let me make clear at the outset that I fully recognize
the right of the Bishop, the Evangelist, and any other per-
son, to criticize the action of the Court. As was said in the
New York Times editorial of September 1, 1963:
Unlimited public discussion is a primary safeguard
of our democracy, even when many of those who ar6
2. This position was one of policy as revealed by the wording of the
question, i.e., "The United States Supreme Court has ruled that no
state or local government may require the reading of the Lord's Prayer
or Bible verses in public schools. What are your views on this?"
Answer: Approve 24%; Disapprove 70%; no opinion 6%. The Wash-
ington Post, August 30, 1963, p. A-2.
[Vol. 15
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talking loudest do not know what they are talking about.
The decisions of the Supreme Court are written by men
on paper, not by gods in letters of fire across the sky.
Critics may distort them. But the Court will have to
trust the good sense of the people, just as the people
trust the good sense of the Court.3
In addition, I also recognize the impropriety of Justices
discussing opinions and I trust that this article will not be
construed as in violation of that precedent. What I say here
is by way of what the Court could not say but which needs
to be said. The article, therefore, expresses only my own
views and nowise reflects those of the Court.
II.
In my opinions for the Court I often clear the atmosphere
by separating the wheat of the case from the chaff of the
contentions of the parties. In this connection I take as
"chaff" any claim that the Court - or for that matter any
court to my knowledge - has a tendency "toward throwing
God and the Bible out of our national life." One has only
to read a few short passages from the opinion of the Court
in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213
(1963) to see that this is not true:
The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devoutly
that there was a God and that the unalienable rights of
man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their
writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitu-
tion itself. This background is evidenced today in our
public life through the continuance in our oaths of office
from the Presidency to the Alderman of the final sup-
plication "So help me God." Likewise each House of
Congress provides through its Chaplain an opening
prayer, and the sessions of this Court are declared open
by the crier in a short ceremony, the final phrase of
which invokes the grace of God. Again, there are such
manifestations in our military forces, where those of
our citizens who are under the restrictions of the mili-
3. 1 trust that the TIMEs has no objection to this addendum taken
from the 4th Chapter, the 8th Verse cf Philippians: "Finally, my brethren,
whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honorable, what-
soever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are
lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and
if there be any praise, think on these things."
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tary service wish to engage in voluntary worship. In-
deed, only last year an official survey of the country in-
dicated that 64% of our people have church membership
. . .while less than 3% profess no religion whatever.
. . . It can be truly said, therefore, that today, as in
the beginning, our national life reflects a religious peo-
ple who, in the words of Madison, are "earnestly praying,
as . . . in duty bound, that the Supreme Lawgiver of
the Universe ... guide them into every measure which
may be worthy of his [blessing .... ]"
Moreover the final paragraph of the opinion (p. 226) de-
molishes any such assertions in this language:
The place of religion in our society is an exalted one,
achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the home,
the church and the inviolable citadel of the individual
heart and mind. We have come to recognize through
bitter experience that it is not within the power of gov-
ernment to invade that citadel, whether its purpose or
effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard. In the
relationship between man and religion, the State is
firmly committed to a position of neutrality.
Finally, the Court's opinion (p. 225) used this language in
pointed reference to the charge of promoting a "religion of
secularism":
It is insisted that unless these religious exercises are
permitted a "religion of secularism" is established in the
schools. We agree of course that the State may not
establish a "religion of secularism" in the sense of af-
firmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion,
thus "preferring those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe." . . .We do not agree, however,
that this decision in any sense has that effect. . . . It
certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study
for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have
said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of
religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular
program of education, may not be effected consistent
with the First Amendment. [Emphasis supplied.]
III.
Perhaps the most difficult matter for some to understand
regarding the government-religion problem is why the re-
[Vol. Is
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quired recitation of a few verses of the Bible or the reading
of the Lord's Prayer in a public school could reach the
proportions of "an establishment of religion," prohibited by
the First Amendment. It is, therefore, well for us to exam-
ine just how an "establishment" can occur.
The phrase "respecting the establishment of religion"
prohibits situations where the church and state are one;
where the church may control the state and vice versa; and
where there is some working arrangement between the two.
These, of course, are "pure" establishment cases which run
counter to the Amendment; however, the Establishment
Clause also precludes religious "exercises" prescribed by the
state. This interpretation was placed upon the Amendment
in the light of the word "respecting" ("Congress shall pass
no law respecting an establishment of religion . . ." [em-
phasis supplied]). In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.
1, 18 (1947), the Court held that "State power is no more to be
used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them."
This was confirmed at the next Term in McCollum v. Board
of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). Whether the "exercise"
under scrutiny is a "religious" one is a question of fact to be
determined by the courts. Finally, the term includes the
furnishing of funds or facilities by the state where the
purpose and primary effect is to advance religion. In the
eight cases in which the Establishment Clause has been di-
rectly considered by the Court in its 173 years, the Court
has consistently held that the clause withdrew all legislative
power respecting religious belief or the expression thereof.
It is significant to note that on this point only one Justice
has ever dissented.
In addition, many people do not understand the signifi-
cance of the last phrase of the First Amendment, known as
the "Free Exercise Clause": "Congress shall pass no law
. . . prohibiting the free exercise thereof [religion]." This
prohibition has also been interpreted many times by the
Court. The concensus of these cases is that the clause "recog-
nizes the value of religious training, teaching and observance
and, more particularly, the right of every person to freely
choose his own course with reference thereto [religion], free
of any compulsion from the state .... Thus, the two clauses
[Establishment and Free Exercise] may overlap." supra, at
p. 222, The Free Exercise Clause secures the individuaPs
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religious liberty by prohibiting state invasion of that sanc-
tuary. It strips the state of all legislative power in the exer-
tion of any restraint on the individual's free exercise of
religion. Under the Free Exercise Clause, as opposed to
the Establishment Clause, it is necessary for one seeking
redress to show some coercive effect upon the practice of
his religion. As was said in Schempp, supra at p. 223 "The
distinction between the two clauses is apparent - a violation
of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while
the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended."
Another thing that is confusing to many people is the his-
torical incongruity existing in these interpretations of the
Amendment. Two legislative enactments restricting freedom
of religion were among the causes for the immigration of
our forefathers to America: The Conventicle Act, passed
during the reign of Charles II (1665), sought to compel at-
tendance at the Established Church by making it a criminal
offense for anyone over 16 years of age to attend other
church services; the Text Act, adopted during the same reign,
required the making of oaths in support of the established
religion.
It is strange that the very men who escaped this religious
persecution by coming to America began their career in
the new land with intolerance and persecution. The Estab-
lished Church was set up in a number of the Colonies and
taxes were levied in its support. Not until Madison and Jef-
ferson waged an all-out battle in 1784 in Virginia was a
law adopted declaring "that any interference by the civil
authority with religious opinion is against natural right."
The same clause had failed of adoption at the Constitutional
Convention. It should be pointed out, however, that several
of the states had such clauses in their own constitutions
calling for religious freedom. At the meeting of the First
Congress (1789) Madison introduced a Bill in the House of
Representatives that is reflected in the present First Amend-
ment. It was first rejected by the Senate but later reinstated
in the Bill of Rights thereafter adopted by the states.
At the time of the adoption of the First Amendment the
Catholics were discriminated against in Pennsylvania and
Delaware. The Church of England was officially established
in five Colonies and substantially supported in New York
and New Jersey. The Congregationalist Church was officially
[Vol. 15
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established in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Con-
necticut. By 1833, however, all of the established churches
had been abolished and direct state support of religion sus-
pended. It is, therefore, fair to say that in writing the First
Amendment the Founders did not have in mind a situation
comparable to that which confronts us in the public schools
today. Indeed, education was then under private sponsor-
ship, almost altogether controlled by the Protestant sects.
Not until Andrew Jackson's day was a strong movement
organized to free the public schools of sectarian influence.
Some states prohibited the giving of religious instruction
by forbidding appropriations therefor. See Moehlman, "The
Wall of Separation Between Church and State" 132-135.
Other states adopted laws prohibiting the use of sectarian
material in the schools. Massachusetts started a new ap-
proach in 1827 by prohibiting the purchase of any school-
books "calculated to favor any particular religious sect or
tenet." 2 Stokes, "Church and State in the United States" 53.
Other states quickly followed this example. And so we find
that at the time of the adoption of the 14th Amendment no
state had an established religion - no state offered religious
teaching in the public schools (not including higher educa-
tion) and most states directly prohibited such instruction.
IV.
A third confusing element in the area of government-
church relations is occasioned by the fact that laymen can-
not understand why the language of the First Amendment
applies to the states. The amendment says that Congress
shall pass no law; not that the states shall not so do. The
answer is found in a series of Supreme Court opinions in-
terpreting the due process clause. Beginning in 1925 with
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Court as-
sumed "that freedom of speech and of the press . . . which
are protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by
Congress . . . are among the Fundamental personal rights
and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States" [em-
phasis supplied]. At p. 666. Grosjean v. Amerficn Press
Co., 297 U.S. 23, 244 (1936) rqaffirme4 that freedom of
the press is included within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Then came De Jonge v. Oregon, 29a U.S. 363j
364 (1937) holding that freedom to assemble is protected
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against impairment by the states. Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) again followed Gitlow. And in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), the Court
held through Mr. Justice Roberts:
The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that
Amendment [Fourteenth] embraces the liberties guar-
anteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment
declares that Congress shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered
the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress
to enact such laws.
Nothing could be clearer or more commanding. This Court
has reconsidered the question again and again. In each
instance it has approved and followed Ccntwell.4 Further-
more, although not referred to by the Court in any of these
opinions, there can be no doubt that the draftsmen of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended it to embrace individual
freedom from state governmental involvement in the affairs
of religion just as the Establishment Clause had originally
foreclosed action on the part of Congress. The report of
the Senate Committee indicated clearly its understanding of
the First Amendment:
If Congress has passed any law, or should pass any
law which, fairly construed, has in any degree intro-
duced, or should attempt to introduce, in favor of any
church, or ecclesiastical association, or system of religi-
ous faith, all or any one of these obnoxious particulars
... endowment at the public expense, peculiar privileges
to its members or disadvantages or penalties upon those
who should reject its doctrines or belong to other com-
munions ... such law would be a "law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion" and, therefore, in violation of the
Constitution. S. Rep. No. 376, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2.
In' 1868, the year in which the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified, the distinguished Thomas M. Cooley restated
4. Mutdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 71-72-.(1947); Illinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 210-211 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961);
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
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the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment in his "Constitu-
tional Limitations":
Those things which are not lawful under any of the
American constitutions may be stated thus:
1. Any law respecting an establishment of religion....
2. Compulsory support, by taxation or otherwise, of re-
ligious instruction. Not only is no one denomination
to be favored at the expense of the rest, but all sup-
port of religious instruction must be entirely volun-
tary. (1st Ed. pp. 469.)
V.
Having explored the scope of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses, we now return to a consideration of the
unique pluralistic character of our religious heritage which
we mentioned heretofore. In most Western Nations religious
pluralism was occasioned by the decay of an existing single
religion. However, our social character, being made up of
so many immigrating nationalities, has emerged with an
even greater divergence of religious thought and habit. We
often identify aspects of this religious thought and habit
with aspects of our diverse social character, thus creating
an illusion of a paradoxical religious showcase in which we
appear as "the most religious and still the most secular of
Nations." Perhaps this fact throws light upon Mr. Graham's
declaration that "secularism" is our "fastest growing re-
ligion." There is thought, which expatiates further, that
"the contemporary tendency to identify prophetic and critical
religion with the prevailing aims and norms of American
culture," that is, secular interests, results "in a loss of vi-
tality, direction, and identity, both with respect to our
American values and national sense of purpose, as well as
affect the creative sense of historical responsibility inherent
in our religious heritage."5 In assessing the value of religious
pluralism, Professor Wilber G. Katz in a recent issue of
"The Episcopalian Magazine" holds that our society has been
drifting steadily for some years toward an unofficial "estab-
lishment" of a nonsectarian religion. It has, the Professor
finds; no particular creed but places its belief in a God
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that is pro-American. Its orators relate their opposition
to particular practices to the "Un-American" character of
the latter and in this connotation enshrine "a national faith"
of nonsectarian character. This onus of a lack of patriotism
would likely fall, the Professor says, upon adherents of par-
ticular religious sects or disbelievers as a whole. He recalls,
in support of his thesis, that one of the lawyers- in, the
Schempp case argued that "public school recitation of the
Lord's Prayer is not a religious act but a mere exercise in
civic morality." Professor Katz points out that the "danger
is that children might regard all prayer in this light." I
would only add from my observation that rather than "a
danger" the Professor has uncovered a reality. Young people
today do not seem to practice prayer. They have been taught
a self-reliance that one can only admire. But their average
make-up seems devoid of religious background and training.
I. believe, however, that we can safely say that a "national
faith" is too far in the offing to, be given serious considera-
tion, today. Likewise, the effort to draft a non-denominational
prayer has been put in limbo. Madison himself undertook
it without encouragement or success. See 9 Writings of
James Madison [Hunt Edition, 1910] 126. And only recently
"a common core" prayer has been declared offensive to
several powerful groups, i.e., The National Council of the
Churches of Christ, the American Council on Education
and others which are influential in the field. See 29 TENN.
LAW REVIEW 363, 417 (1962). Also 76 HARVARD LAW REVIEW
25, 51 (1962).
Summing up, our government-religion problem is clearly
exemplified by the analogy of Professor Harry Jones who
likened it to the Biblical expression of the "Great Authority",
who said:
In my Father's house are many mansions;
if it were not so I would- have told you.
As the Professor points out, "Whatever relations may, exist
qomew here and hereafter among, the residents of these many
mansions, they are not always good. and cordial neighbors
on, earth." "Religion and Contemporary Society," supr¢a, at
p. 157. While this observation needs no documentation. one
need only point to the Presidential campaign of 1960, the
864 [Vol. t6
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bombings of synagogues of a few years ago and like occur,
rences.
To some, such practices as recitation of prayers in school
are minor encroachments on the prohibition of the First
Amendment. However, to others, these identical practices
may seem monstrous because they impinge upon religious
beliefs or non-beliefs. It is not just the agnostic or the
Unitarian or the Jew who objects to such encroachments;
my mail indicates that it runs the whole gamut of denomina-
tions. But be this as it may, the fact remains that a "trick-
ling stream" of encroachment today might well be a "raging
torrent" of "establishment" tomorrow. History reveals noth-
ing more clearly. In any event, the Court has no choice -
whether the encroachment be small or monstrous, the First
Amendment prohibits all. The cases of this Court going
back a score of years have so held. It is, therefore, in no
sense a new constitutional interpretation, but merely the
same rule applied to existing factual situations.
Moreover, who can say that the establishment here of a
single denomination as our official church is a fantastic
dream? Established churches are no phenomena in our pres-
ent day world. Italy, Spain and Austria have a Confessional
church; Sweden and Norway, national ones; Pakistan prac-
tices the Muslim faith and Burma the Buddhist; and the
Church of England still stands as the "establishment" in
that land. While no church is presently seeking official
status here, there is keen competition among the various
faiths for the souls of men. Furthermore, the halls of Con-
gress and the State Legislatures, as well, witness more and
more requests for governmental assistance of some type. Who
knows but when such enactments - always the result of
public or special interest pressures - may contravene the
commands of the Amendment. During President Jefferson's
administration there were two instances where he vetoed
Acts of Congress, presumedly because he believed them to
violate the Amendment.
It is in the light of all of these circumstances and condi-
tions that the courts have forged the rule of wholesome
neutrality, which Judge Alphonso Taft enunciated almost a
hundred years ago (1870) as the ideal of our people. "The
government is neutral," he declared, "and, while protecting
86ry
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all, it prefers none, and it disparages none." This sage pro-
nunciation by the father of Chief Justice Taft has been
written into our cases for over two decades and is now and
has been all during that period the law of this land.
Present world conditions make it the more imperative that
this sacred right of the individual be fully recognized and
equally enforced. It may be, as Bishop Pike says, that in
affording this recognition that we must "put up with sore
thumbs, rocks in the shoe, bulls in the china shop." So
what? Who knows "but there goes I" as a sore thumb, rock
in the shoe or bull in the china shop!
As I see it government can maintain this wholesome neu-
trality - provided, and provided only - that Christian
leadership does its part. Rather than continually pressuring
government into becoming a promoter of religion, leadership
must encourage the people to have hearts to conceive ways
to strengthen religion in our private lives, to have under-
standing to direct the improvement of a religious atmosphere
among our people and the courage to execute both. There
is no better place to develop religion than in the home, at
the church and in the Sunday School. In my day it was
the job of the parents and the preachers and Sunday School
teachers to inculcate and develop a religious atmosphere
among children. What we need is more people doing this and
fewer passing the buck onto the public schools. One fledgling
prayer leader in the home is worth a dozen parroters in
the schoolhouse. As one church trustee, who was born an
Episcopalian and for some 39 years has by marriage been
a Presbyterian, I stand foursquare on the "Presbyterian
Memorial" of June 12, 1776, which was enunciated by much
wiser and more religious men than I. It said in part:
Neither can it be made to appear that the gospel
needs any such civil aid; [we] rather conceive that,
when our blessed Saviour declares his kingdom is not
of this world, he renounces all dependence upon State
power, and . . . [we] are persuaded that, if mankind
were left in the quiet possession of their unalienable
religious privileges, Christianity ... would ... flourish
in the greatest purity -by its own native excellence,
and under the all-disposing, providence of God.8
6. HOWE, CASES ON CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1952).
866,
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